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In “Rhetoric, dialectic and derailment in church-state arguments” Battistelli discusses a 
topic that is of vital importance to the study of argumentation: the extent to which 
dialectical and rhetorical approaches can be reconciled. After reviewing some 
conceptions of rhetoric in modern argumentation theory he proposes an alternative 
conceptualization based on classical sophistic tradition that exceeds the bounds set by the 
pragma-dialectical notion of strategic manoeuvring. Before commenting on Battistelli’s 
alternative, it may be helpful to provide some background information concerning my 
own view on the matter. 
 The issue of the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric is an old one and the 
discussion and about this issue can easily be prolonged to become an eternal one. A 
precondition for coming to any conclusion is, of course, that it is first made clear what 
exactly is understood by “dialectic” and “rhetoric.” And this is precisely where the 
difficulties start. I think that two general approaches to this question can be distinguished: 
first, an approach that has primarily an empirical-historical basis; second, an approach 
that is in the first place theoretically-systematic. 
In the empirical-historical approach, which may easily acquire essentialistic traits, 
the definition of dialectic and rhetoric is made dependent on what a certain historical 
source understood dialectic and rhetoric to be. When it comes to rhetoric, this source 
may, for instance, be Aristotle, Hermagoras of Temnos, Cicero or Quintilian — a new 
tendency is to go back all the way to the sophists. In any case, as regards their definition 
of rhetoric there are considerable differences between the various potential sources and it 
is hard to make out on empirical-historical grounds which choice is the best. All the 
same, this does not seem prevent some scholars from declaring their favoured choice 
sacrosanct. 
The standardized version of classical rhetorical theory that is nowadays generally 
taught in rhetoric classes has blurred the existing diversity among rhetoricians regarding 
the definition of rhetoric. Since no one has taken out a patent for the use of the term 
rhetoric, a choice can be made freely and because of the incongruities between the 
definitions such a choice has to be made. In the absence of any further explanation one 
gets the impression that more often than not the choice that is made just depends on what 
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the theorist concerned suits or likes best. An additional, “technical” problem of the 
empirical-historical approach is by the way that the conceptions of rhetoric developed in 
antiquity are not always fully clear to the modern mind so that a philological clarification 
is required—and even after this clarification is provided they may still not fully cover 
modern argumentative reality. 
In his essay Battistelli shows himself to be, grosso modo, a representative of the 
empirical-historical approach to rhetoric. Before explaining what he thinks rhetoric is, he 
stresses after all that it is a drawback of the conception of rhetoric adhered to by modern 
argumentation scholars such as Jacobs, Rescher, and Slob that it “is not consonant with 
the full range of rhetorical theory available.” 
The theoretically-systematic approach to dialectic and rhetoric, which is chosen 
by argumentation theorists such as myself, is guided by theoretical considerations 
concerning what conception of dialectic and rhetoric is most constructive for realizing the 
analytic and evaluative objectives of their research program. Rather than being a 
philologist, I am an argumentation theorist who tries to make good use of historical and 
philological insights to enrich his theory. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation 
we have developed in Amsterdam starts from a critical rationalist idea of reasonableness 
and in building this theory we paid tribute (like Popper did before us) to our source of 
inspiration in classical dialectic as portrayed in Plato’s Socratic dialogues and described 
by Aristotle. 
When pragma-dialectics started in a later stage of its development to involve 
effectiveness next to reasonableness in its theorizing through the notion of strategic 
manoeuvring we realized immediately that vital insights concerning the effectiveness of 
argumentative discourse could be derived from rhetoric — starting with classical rhetoric. 
In pursuing this endeavour we started from the division of labour between dialectic and 
rhetoric that can be found in Aristotle’s work but soon enough we realised that an 
integrated dialectical and rhetorical approach was due. Most important, however, for 
these comments, is that we concentrated on rhetorical insights that can play a role in the 
pragma-dialectical theorizing concerning argumentation. 
From the outset we have made it clear that, rather than special ways of conducting 
argumentation, dialectic and rhetoric are to us theoretical perspectives that can be used in 
analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse, which may complement each other. 
As far as rhetoric is concerned, our point of departure has always been that the rhetorical 
effectiveness of strategic manoeuvres in not just determined by the presentational choices 
that are made (“stylistics”), but also by the adaptation of the manoeuvres to the (primary 
or secondary) audience that is to be convinced (“audience management”) and the way in 
which the available topical potential is exploited in accordance with the dialectical and 
rhetorical requirement of the argumentative situation (“topical invention”). These three 
aspects are in our view (as expressed in the “strategic manoeuvring triangle”) inextricably 
united in the argumentative moves that are made and they are only distinguished from 
each other for analytic reasons. 
In his essay, Battistelli makes a major issue of distinguishing between “unilateral” 
and “multilateral” views of rhetoric. I wonder, to be honest, whether Batistelli is right in 
suggesting that unilaterality was the focal point of the critique of rhetoric delivered by 
Plato cum suis. Battistelli is certainly right however in observing—in a completely 
different vein—that rhetoric was to Plato’s Socrates “an art of appealing to appetites and 
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appearances quite distinct from a dialectical process of reasoning that uncovers substance 
and truth.” In any case, as regards multilateralness, I see eye to eye with Battistelli, 
because I too prefer a multilateral view of rhetoric, if only because this fits nicely with 
our conception of strategic manoeuvring as always involving simultaneously a dialectical 
dimension and a rhetorical dimension. The more parallel the two theoretical perspectives 
(are made to) run the easier it will be to put the insights their combination provides to 
good use in analyzing and evaluating strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse. 
“The rhetorical mindset is always inhabiting an unspoken dialogue,” Battistelli contends. 
I surely hope this is true because it agrees very well with the approach to argumentative 
discourse promoted in extended pragma-dialectics. 
I cannot find fault either with Battistelli’s view that rhetoric is more than just 
style. This is in fact what we emphatically claimed when talking about the three aspects 
of strategic manoeuvring and this is also why I reject Battistelli’s allegation that we start 
from a definition of rhetoric which “remove[s] rhetoric from any role in the process of 
generating and exchanging viewpoints.” Not only does the pragma-dialectical view of 
rhetoric through its association with dialectic in the notion of strategic manoeuvring not 
at all presuppose the “passive audience” denounced by Battistelli, because both parties 
can influence the progress of the argumentation process at every point (so much for 
viewing rhetoric in terms of “a static set of expectations concerning the audience”), but 
also does the pragma-dialectical view of rhetoric explicitly include a creative dimension 
of inventio by incorporating for both parties making topical choices as a third aspect of 
strategic manoeuvring.  
Another important point to note is that pragma-dialecticians do indeed think that 
from rhetoric insights can be derived regarding the effectiveness of argumentation, but 
that this claim cannot be reversed: we do not say that rhetorical insights are always 
necessarily insights regarding effectiveness. It might even be true that Battistelli is right 
in suggesting that rhetoric offers useful insights “outside strategic manoeuvring” for 
making clear how certain verbal or non-verbal moves may be helpful in establishing or 
restoring the fulfilment of what pragma-dialecticians call “higher order” conditions for 
conducting a critical discussion. Minister Scott’s appeals to pathos which, according to 
Battistelli, “aim to serve another role in [his] attempt at furthering the discussion” seem a 
good example. Just before Battistelli states his general conclusion, he makes another 
relevant observation: “[O]nce argumentation has derailed, rhetoric can provide the means 
for opening up solidified attitudes through appeal to the ambiguity and plurality of 
opinion existing in a given rhetorical setting.” Battistellis’s observations resemble those 
of Jacobs, and it becomes clear that rhetoric as he views it has an important role to play in 
indicating how to promote reasonableness in argumentative reality. 
Although—as should be clear by now—I like the constructive thrust of 
Battistelli’s expose, I also think that in pushing his point he sometimes exaggerates a bit 
so that he proves himself guilty of moving his portrayal of argumentative reality too 
much into his own direction at the expense of remaining credible to the unconverted. A 
striking example is: “In a sense, neither the rhetor’s nor audience’s ideas are their own 
but are instead an inchoate amalgam of each other’s.” Another implausible exaggeration 
is “[O]ne’s own point is never truly one’s own but emerges from one's enmeshed position 
in the network of social discourse.” Eventually, however, both Battistelli and I agree with 
Cicero that, in spite of the Ciceronian wisdom that the identities of rhetor and audience 
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“are not easily separable,” an arguer must “deal with people as they are” and has to find 
arguments and appeals “he knows are likely to appeal to his audience.” The problem is 
that we have only just entered a new stage in the development of argumentation theory in 
which dialectical and rhetorical insights are brought to bear together in systematically 
analyzing and evaluating situated argumentative discourse and that we still have to find 
out how exactly the question of how to trace such arguments and appeals can be tackled. 
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